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O n March 29, 2008, Zimbabwe will hold presiden-tial and parliamentary elections. Few peoplebelieve that they will be free and fair or that Robert
Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union–
Patriotic Front party will fail to return to office. 
That is a tragedy, because Mugabe and his cronies are
chiefly responsible for an economic meltdown that has
turned one of Africa’s most prosperous countries into a
country with one of the lowest life expectancies in the
world. Since 1994, the average life expectancy in Zimbabwe
has fallen from 57 years to 34 years for women and from 54
years to 37 years for men. Some 3,500 Zimbabweans die
every week from the combined effects of HIV/AIDS, pover-
ty, and malnutrition. Half a million Zimbabweans may
have died already. There is no freedom of speech or assem-
bly in Zimbabwe, and the state has used violence to intimi-
date and murder its opponents. 
At the root of Zimbabwe’s problems is a corrupt political
elite that has, with considerable international support,
behaved with utter impunity for some two decades. This
elite is determined to hang on to power no matter what the
consequences, lest it be held to account for the genocide in
Matabeleland in the early 1980s and the wholesale looting
of Zimbabwe that followed the mismanaged land reform in
2000. 
When change comes to Zimbabwe, the nation will have
to rediscover the rule of law and the sanctity of persons and
property. The public discourse and the economy will have
to be reopened. The new government will have to embrace
a more limited idea of government and rescind legislation
that makes the operation of the private sector next to
impossible. Moreover, the new government will have to
find a way for the people of Zimbabwe to heal the wounds
caused by decades of political violence.
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Executive Summary
Snapshot of an Economic
Collapse
The economic decline of Zimbabwe, which
started in 1997, has been startling (see Figure
1). For example, if not for remittances from
relatives abroad, the 2007 purchasing power
of the average Zimbabwean would have fallen
to levels last seen in the 1950s. In terms of
physical output, about 35 years of economic
progress have been undone in a decade. Gross
domestic product (GDP) declined by about
43 percent between 2000 and 2007.1
Not surprisingly, every sector of the for-
merly diverse Zimbabwean economy was
affected. The mainstay of the economy, agri-
culture, was all but destroyed by the politically
expedient and often violent land reform pro-
gram initiated by Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe
African National Union–Patriotic Front gov-
ernment in 2000. For example, annual wheat
production has plummeted from a high of
over 300,000 tons in 1990 to less than 50,000
in 2007 (see Figure 2).
The tobacco industry, which was Zimbab-
we’s single largest generator of foreign ex-
change and accounted for almost a third of
Zimbabwe’s foreign exchange earnings in
2000, has almost completely collapsed. The
crop that earned some US$600 million in
2000 generated less than US$125 million in
2007 (see Figure 3).
The government’s failure to keep spending
in line with the requirements of the Economic
Structural Adjustment Program that was
administered by the International Monetary
Fund meant that the government had to bor-
row domestically—thus driving up the rate of
interest and with it also the cost of borrowing
for manufacturers. The manufacturing sector
has shrunk by more than 47 percent between
1998 and 2006, which carried output levels
back to figures recorded in 1972(see Figure 4).2
Foreign aid that Zimbabwe received as part
of the ESAP strengthened the Zimbabwean
dollar and increased imports. Local manufac-
turers, therefore, found themselves under pres-
sure from the rapid increases in local costs, par-
ticularly interest rates, and the decreasing
demand for their goods as competition from
imports increased.3
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Figure 1
Annual GDP Growth in Zimbabwe, 1980–2007
Source: John Robertson, “August 2007 Forecast Paper,” Robertson Economic Information Services for Zimbabwean Statistics, http://www.economic.co.zw.
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Figure 2
Annual Wheat Production, 1975–2007
Source: John Robertson, “August 2007 Forecast Paper,” Robertson Economic Information Services for Zimbabwean
Statistics, http://www.economic.co.zw.
Figure 3
Annual Earnings from Tobacco, 2001–2007
Source: John Robertson, “August 2007 Forecast Paper,” Robertson Economic Information Services for Zimbabwean
Statistics, http://www.economic.co.zw.
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Since 2005, government policies have fur-
ther hurt the manufacturing sector. Particu-
larly damaging is a law that requires exporters
to sell up to 30 percent of their foreign ex-
change earnings to Zimbabwe’s Reserve Bank
at an artificial exchange rate that is a fraction
of the real market rate. Members of the ruling
regime and their associates have become rich
by buying up foreign currency at the official
exchange rate and then selling it at the black-
market rate, pocketing the difference.
The final blow to the manufacturing sector
has come from the government’s price control
policy announced at the end of June 2007. In
an effort to stem runaway inflation, the gov-
ernment announced halving all prices. In the
six months that followed, manufacturing out-
put fell by more than 50 percent and, unless
they could export their goods, many manufac-
turing firms had to shut down.4
Blessed with some of the best mineral re-
serves in the world, Zimbabwe has vast
deposits of iron, nickel, platinum, coal,
chrome, asbestos, diamonds, tantalite, coal-
bed methane, and gold. Yet mining, which
should have boomed over the last decade
because of global economic expansion in
general and China’s hunger for natural re-
sources in particular, has, with the notable
exception of platinum, all but collapsed. 
Gold is a good example. Zimbabwe has
vast reserves of gold still stuck beneath its
soil. More than 90 percent of those deposits
are located in the granite-greenstone terrain
that covers about 60 percent of the country.
Zimbabwe has more than 6,000 recorded
deposits and the capacity to produce at least
25 tons of gold annually. World gold prices
have steadily increased over the last decade.
Despite that price increase, gold production
in Zimbabwe has plummeted in the last
decade. In 2006, Zimbabwe suffered its low-
est annual output since 1907 (see Figure 5).
As was the case with the manufacturing
sector, the government’s decision to force the
mining companies to exchange some of their
earnings at the official exchange rate under-
mined gold production. As a result, the sec-
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Figure 4
Manufacturing Performance, 1996–2006
Source: John Robertson, “August 2007 Forecast Paper,” Robertson Economic Information Services for Zimbabwean
Statistics, http://www.economic.co.zw.
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tor has become unviable. Virtually every oth-
er type of mining in Zimbabwe was similarly
affected. In 2006, for example, coal produc-
tion dropped to its lowest level since 1946.5
Zimbabwe is a country blessed with natural
beauty. In addition to the magnificent Victoria
Falls, Zimbabwe also has some of the best
game reserves in Africa, stunning mountain-
ous areas, and a wonderful climate. Unfortun-
ately, because of the racist hate speech directed
against white people by the ZANU-PF govern-
ment and the oppressive and often violent
political atmosphere, most foreign airlines
have stopped flying into the country and
tourist arrivals have plummeted. Consequent-
ly, annual foreign earnings from tourism in
2006 were less than one-tenth of what they
were a decade ago (see Figure 6).
The informal sector of the economy has
not been immune from the government’s pre-
dations. In May 2005, the government em-
barked on what it termed “Operation Mur-
ambatsvina”—roughly translated as “clean
out the filth”—aimed at the urban poor. In
the course of two months, the army and the
police drove some 700,000 of Zimbabwe’s
poorest urban-based people out of their
homes, depriving them of their livelihoods in
the process. As a consequence, the United
Nations condemned the government of Zim-
babwe.6
According to the UN, the informal econo-
my in 1980 was relatively small, accounting
for less than 10 percent of the labor force. Its
size was partly attributable to various laws
and bylaws that prohibited the movement of
indigenous people, especially from rural to
urban areas. With liberalization of travel, and
subsequent economic stagnation and even-
tual decline after independence, the informal
sector share of employment grew to about 20
percent in 1986 and to an estimated 40 per-
cent in 2004. The informal economy had
effectively become the main source of income
for the majority of Zimbabweans by 2005
when Operation Murambatsvina took place.7
In June 2005, nearly 3 million Zimbabweans
earned their living through informal-sector
employment, supporting another 5 million
people, while the formal sector employed only
about 1.3 million people.8 Although Operation
Murambatsvina was directed against poor peo-
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Source: John Robertson, “August 2007 Forecast Paper,” Robertson Economic Information Services for Zimbabwean
Statistics, http://www.economic.co.zw.
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Figure 6
Annual Earnings from Tourism, 1997–2006
Source: John Robertson, “August 2007 Forecast Paper,” Robertson Economic Information Services for Zimbabwean
Statistics, http://www.economic.co.zw.
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Figure 7
Formal-Sector Employment, 1991–2005
Source: John Robertson, “August 2007 Forecast Paper,” Robertson Economic Information Services for Zimbabwean
Statistics, http://www.economic.co.zw.
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ple, its effect on the formal economy was also
severe. The informal sector of the economy has
not yet recovered. Remaining employment in
the formal sector is also dropping rapidly (see
Figure 7).
Humanitarian Catastrophe
Zimbabwe’s economy is now in a free fall.
Inflation, according to official (and thus very
conservative) government figures, now exceeds
8,000 percent a year. Respected economists
believe that inflation is probably in excess of
150,000 percent a year.9 To put this figure in
perspective, the country with the next-highest
inflation rate, Iraq, has a rate of 53 percent a
year.10
The human cost of Zimbabwe’s economic
crisis has been catastrophic. Millions of Zim-
babweans have left the country, with 3 million
fleeing to South Africa alone.11 Over 80 per-
cent of Zimbabweans remaining in the coun-
try are now unemployed. The estimated pro-
portion of the population living below the
official poverty line has more than doubled
since the mid-1990s and is now over 80 per-
cent.12 Zimbabwe’s human development indi-
cators rank 151st of 177 countries surveyed.13
In 2006, the World Health Organization
reported that people living in Zimbabwe have
one of the lowest life expectancies in the world.
Since 1994, the average life expectancy for
women in Zimbabwe has fallen from 57 years
to 34 years and for men from 54 years to 37
years. The WHO believes that life expectancy
rates will continue to fall.14
The WHO estimates that some 3,500 Zim-
babweans die every week through the deadly
combination of HIV/AIDS, poverty, and mal-
nutrition.15 The estimates of the humanitarian
catastrophe in Zimbabwe vary. Richard Wil-
liam Johnson, South African academic and for-
mer head of the Helen Suzman Foundation,
suggests that between 2 million and 6 million
people may have died because of the calamitous
economic situation in Zimbabwe since the late
1990s.16 To put that estimate in a global con-
text, in April 2007, the UN estimated that some
450,000 people may have died as a result of the
conflict in Darfur that started in 2003.17
Johnson’s estimate is in line with the mas-
sive discrepancy in the numbers reported by
the last two censuses in Zimbabwe. The 1992
census estimated that by the time of the 2002
census, 14 million people should have lived
in Zimbabwe. But the August 2002 census
found only 11 million in the country—and
that finding was before the exodus of Zim-
babweans that has occurred since 2002. 
Precise data are difficult to gather in a dic-
tatorship suffering from chaos and economic
collapse. However, I have been a member of
Zimbabwe’s parliament since 2000 and have
participated in the debates concerning the
economic and humanitarian situation in the
country. I have had access to information that,
because of pervasive censorship in Zimbabwe,
is not easily available to others. Consequently,
in addition to all the people who have left the
country, I am persuaded that at least half a
million Zimbabweans have died because of
Zimbabwe’s economic collapse.
According to findings released in July 2006
by the Zimbabwe Demographic Health Survey,
the health of Zimbabwean children has deteri-
orated dramatically. For example, in 70 percent
of Zimbabwe’s provinces, more children suffer
from stunted growth now than previously. In
one province, stunted growth among children
increased by 38 percent between 1999 and
2006. The number of children receiving all of
the recommended vaccinations dropped by 21
percent between 1999 and 2006. Over the same
period, the percentage of children receiving no
vaccinations at all rose to 21 percent. The situ-
ation has become graver since 2006 because of
further economic decline in Zimbabwe. Oper-
ation Murambatsvina has no doubt con-
tributed to the increase in general mortality
rates. According to the Zimbabwe Department
of Health Services preliminary report, a great
number of those displaced under that opera-
tion were children.18
Another problem that Zimbabwe faces is
HIV/AIDS. In a report released in June 2006,
the UN stated that Zimbabwe has one of the
highest incidences of HIV/AIDS in the world.
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Southern Africa is the epicenter of the global
HIV/AIDS pandemic. Nine of the 10 coun-
tries with the highest levels of HIV/AIDS
infection in the world are in southern Africa.
Zimbabwe is one of them.19
What makes HIV/AIDS particularly seri-
ous in Zimbabwe is that the government has
dedicated the bulk of its dwindling resources
to maintaining its hold on power, leaving little
or no money for HIV/AIDS prevention and
provision of antiretroviral drugs. Unfortun-
ately, only a tiny fraction of those suffering
from HIV/AIDS appears to be on regular
courses of medication.20
Nevertheless, the ZANU-PF government
prefers to spend money on keeping its own
people at bay. In the 2006 budget, for example,
it earmarked an amount equivalent to 12.5
percent of the total allocation for public
health for the Central Intelligence Organi-
zation, Zimbabwe’s equivalent of the East Ger-
man Stasi. A subsequent announcement that
the government would import new military
aircraft from China underscored the govern-
ment’s priorities, even though the country is
not at war and is surrounded by friendly
states. 
Zimbabwe suffers from high levels of mal-
nutrition exacerbated by the government’s
refusal to acknowledge the extent of the
problem. In December 2007, for example, the
World Food Program warned that Zimbabwe
was one of seven “hotspots” and suggested
that some 4.1 million Zimbabweans will need
food aid before April 2008.21 In August 2007,
the Famine Early Warning Systems Net-
work22 stated the following:
Protracted economic decline, exacerbat-
ed by a poor 2006/07 harvest as well as
current and potential future disrup-
tions of food supply due to recent price
controls and eminent restrictions on
basic commodity imports have caused a
significant decrease in Zimbabwe’s food
security, especially in the southwest and
in urban areas. This year’s cereal pro-
duction is expected to meet only 55 per-
cent of Zimbabwe’s requirements,
according to the UN’s Food and Agri-
culture Organization and World Food
Programme. . . . [The] WFP [World Food
Program] and C-SAFE [Consortium for
Southern Africa Food Security Emerg-
ency] tentatively plan to import about
352,000 MT [metric tons] of food aid to
feed 4.1 million people. While it is con-
ceivable that corn import requirements
could be met, the GMB’s [Grain Mar-
keting Board’s] ability to distribute
maize [corn] is a serious concern, as, in
the past, GMB distributions have been
erratic, and local shortages are com-
mon.23
Human rights organizations within Zim-
babwe believe that the figure of 4 million in
need of food aid is an underestimate because
of the effect of poverty on so many Zimbab-
weans who are nominally employed at best.
People who previously would have been able
to buy food for themselves are no longer able
to do so, and millions of urban poor are visibly
losing weight. Those people are not included
in WFP estimates, however, because of their
“nominal” employment.
The Zimbabwean government has deliber-
ately downplayed the extent of the crisis over
the last few years. The administration has tried
to control the supply of food because by doing
so it is able to use food as a political weapon.
In that way, it can coerce desperate people,
especially in the rural areas, into voting for the
ruling ZANU-PF party. 
Moreover, acknowledging the full extent
of the food shortages would be tantamount
to the government’s admitting the shortages
directly result from its chaotic and corrupt
land reform program rather than from bad
weather as the government likes to claim.
That land reform policy resulted in highly
productive farms being rendered unproduc-
tive by the government ministers, party oper-
atives, army commanders, and judges who
have taken them over.24
The government consistently refuses to
admit the gravity of the problem, and on vari-
ous occasions in the last few years it has delib-
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erately obstructed the WFP and other human-
itarian agencies, preventing them from operat-
ing freely in Zimbabwe. In a television inter-
view that he gave in 2004, for example, Mugabe
said that Zimbabweans did not want to
“choke” on international food aid, which they
did not need.25 The ZANU-PF barred the non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) from dis-
tributing food. The government insisted on
controlling all food distribution, a policy that
the ZANU-PF continued until it won what
was, according to most observers, a rigged
March 2005 general election. 
Because of the government’s policies over
the last few years, millions of Zimbabweans
have been deprived of access to the food sup-
plied by international agencies. Given that
the ZANU-PF has now announced that it will
hold a general election on March 29, 2008,
the party will likely use similar tactics to con-
trol the supply of food to desperate people.
Never before has one country seen such a
convergence of severe economic collapse, high
levels of HIV/AIDS infection, and chronic
malnutrition. Zimbabweans are suffering
from the consequences of the fastest econom-
ic contraction anywhere in the world and high
AIDS/HIV morbidity exacerbated by the
scarcity and widespread shortages of medicine
and food.
Limited International
Interest in Zimbabwe
Despite the gravity of the crisis, interna-
tional interest in Zimbabwe’s agony seems
limited. That lack of interest is attributable
to a number of factors. First, although more
people are dying in Zimbabwe than in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Darfur, Zimbabwe’s men-
tion in the international media is dispropor-
tionately smaller—in part because stories
about Zimbabwe are more difficult to film
and write. The country offers very few stark
images likely to capture the world’s atten-
tion. A casual visitor to Zimbabwe will not
see blood flowing or many children with
kwashiorkor bellies.26 No car bombs explode.
People who die through a combination of
HIV/AIDS, poverty, and malnutrition die
quietly—they literally fade away. The only way
to appreciate the extent of the catastrophe is
to visit morgues and cemeteries, which are
overflowing. The most poignant evidence of
the calamity is found in the dates inscribed
on the headstones and plaques in the ceme-
teries: the vast majority of those being buried
are young people and children.
Second, although the foreign media is
allowed into Darfur, Afghanistan, and Iraq, it
has been generally barred from operating in
Zimbabwe. Draconian laws forbid foreign
journalists from working in Zimbabwe with-
out permission, which is rarely given. The gov-
ernment routinely detains and prosecutes
journalists, and the laws relating to the media
prescribe prison terms for those who infringe
legal stipulations. Unless the world’s media
put the catastrophe at the top of their agen-
das, however, governments elsewhere will re-
ceive little public pressure to take up Zimbab-
we as a political cause.
Third, because Zimbabwe has no oil and
very few strategic mineral resources, no obvi-
ous strategic reason exists why world powers
should want to focus their attention on that
country’s problems. Although Zimbabwe
does have large reserves of platinum, those are
not in sufficiently short supply globally to
warrant special attention from the interna-
tional community. Tragically for Zimbab-
weans, the only interest that the country’s
platinum has aroused internationally is that
of the Chinese, who have proved to be quite
ready to prop up Mugabe’s regime to secure
privileged access to the mineral. 
Fourth, the response of most southern
African governments and the Southern African
Development Community to the catastrophe
unfolding on their doorstep is best described as
a state of denial or paralysis. Until the African
governments act, the rest of the international
community can do little to help Zimbabwe. 
The humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe has
spiraled out of control and there does not
appear to be any international political will to
deal with it decisively and urgently. Many gov-
ernments, including some southern African
governments, simply do not know what to do
and are exasperated by the seemingly intract-
able problem. To provide an effective prescrip-
tion for Zimbabwe’s humanitarian and eco-
nomic ills, however, one must appreciate the
root causes of the disaster.
Political Roots of 
the Current Crisis
Zimbabwe’s humanitarian and economic
crises are rooted in politics. The ZANU-PF
government has been at pains to blame eco-
nomic collapse on the combination of West-
ern sanctions and drought. Neither of those
was the main cause of the problems that the
country faces. Targeted sanctions imposed on
top government officials by the West only
came into effect in 2002—some five years after
Zimbabwe’s economic collapse began. 
Zimbabweans have had to endure sanctions
before. The UN imposed an international trade
embargo on the white minority government of
Rhodesia in 1966. Fourteen years later, the
Zimbabwean economy emerged from the sanc-
tions with one of the largest economies in
Africa and a currency that was stronger than
the U.S. dollar—even though the sanctions
were far more comprehensive in scope than
those currently in place. Although the U.S.
Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recov-
ery Act, for example, obliges the U.S. govern-
ment to vote against the extension of any loans
by international financial institutions to
Zimbabwe, no general trade sanctions are cur-
rently in place, nor are any likely in the foresee-
able future.
Likewise, as Professor Craig J. Richardson
of Salem College pointed out, the historically
close relationship between rainfall and GDP
growth ended in 2000—the first year of the
land reforms. The years after 2000 showed
above-average or average rainfall even as the
economy continued to plummet.27 Thus, the
government cannot credibly blame bad weath-
er for the country’s dismal economic situa-
tion.
The root of Zimbabwe’s woes is the absence
of liberal democracy. In Poverty and Famines: An
Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation, the Nobel
Prize–winning economist Amartya Sen stress-
es the connection between political freedom
and the absence of famine.28 He makes the
point that no country with a free press has ever
had a famine in its recorded history, and he
claims that a free press and an active opposi-
tion constitute the best early warning system a
country threatened by famine can have. The
situation in Zimbabwe supports Sen’s analy-
sis. 
Undermining Political Freedom
(1980–97) 
Three pivotal historical issues are directly
responsible for the failure of Zimbabwe’s
democratic institutions and its calamitous
consequences. 
First, consider the constitution agreed to at
the Lancaster House conference that paved the
way for Zimbabwean independence in 1980. It
was a compromise document, primarily de-
signed to put an end to a bloody civil war. It
perpetuated many oppressive aspects of white
minority rule—including tight state control
over the media. Crucially, it reinforced exces-
sive executive power and resulted in a relatively
weak legislature and judiciary. Although racial
discrimination was abolished, in many other
respects the new Zimbabwe African National
Union government from the very beginning
exercised the same authoritarian powers as had
its predecessor, the white Rhodesian Front.
The ZANU exercised those powers with
Western knowledge and support. Thus, the
Lancaster House constitution created the tem-
plate for authoritarian rule and allowed Robert
Mugabe and the ZANU-PF to consolidate and
later to monopolize power.
In addition, the Lancaster House agree-
ment did not address the fact that atrocities
had been committed by both the Rhodesian
security forces and the guerillas of the two
Black Nationalist armies during the liberation
struggle waged from 1973 to the end of 1979.
It also did not adequately address the human
rights abuses, including racial discrimination
10
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suffered by black Zimbabweans under succes-
sive white minority governments. 
Unlike the agreement that brought an
end to apartheid in South Africa in 1994, the
Lancaster House agreement did not attempt
to address issues of reconciliation and jus-
tice. Although no peace deal is perfect, the
omission of reconciliation and justice meant
that many of those responsible for serious
human rights violations on both sides of the
1970s conflict remained in the armed forces
and have been responsible for genocide,
crimes against humanity, and other human
rights violations perpetrated in the 1980s
and, again, since 2000.
Second, consider the “Gukurahundi” epi-
sode. Soon after taking power in April 1980,
Mugabe had engaged in secret negotiations
with the North Korean dictator Kim Il Sung to
create an army unit specifically designed to deal
with “internal dissent.” Those negotiations cul-
minated in an agreement under whose terms
the North Koreans would train and arm a new
brigade to deal with domestic “malcontents.”
The new brigade came to be known as the 5th
Brigade or “Gukurahundi Brigade.”29
In January 1983 Mugabe’s government sent
the Gukurahundi into Matabeleland, where
the soldiers proceeded to murder approximate-
ly 20,000 civilians. Nationalist leader and later
vice president of Zimbabwe Joshua Nkomo
first used this figure in 1984. Human rights
organizations accepted it as being, if anything,
conservative.30
By March 1983, Western governments
and NGOs were aware of the grave human
rights abuses and crimes against humanity
perpetrated by the ZANU government under
the leadership of Mugabe, if not the full
extent of the genocide.31 Despite the knowl-
edge of those grave crimes, the West turned a
blind eye. In fact, Western governments con-
tinued to send aid to Zimbabwe, and Western
universities continued to award Mugabe
honorary degrees. Adding insult to injury,
the British government knighted Mugabe in
1994.
The failure of the West to act against the
ZANU and later the ZANU-PF government, or
even to condemn the atrocities, created a sense
of impunity in the minds of the ZANU-PF
leadership. That sense of impunity had a
direct bearing on the events of the last few
years. The ZANU-PF regime not only got away
with genocide in the 1980s but also was actu-
ally rewarded in the years that followed
through the continued infusion of substantial
aid and other awards. In that context, the
ZANU-PF leadership not surprisingly believed
that it could act with complete freedom when
it commenced its violent land reform program
in 2000. 
Similarly, although its policies are indefen-
sible, the ZANU-PF perception of the West’s
reaction to its policies since 2000 as racist is
understandable. As the ZANU-PF appa-
ratchiks see it, the West ignored the massacre
of thousands of black Zimbabweans in the
1980s but imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe
following the killing of a handful of white
farmers and a few hundred opposition activists
since 2000.
Tragically, the Gukurahundi episode still
haunts the entire nation and is pivotal to
understanding what motivates the ZANU-PF
government and Mugabe today. Mugabe is in
possession of two critically important pieces of
intelligence that undoubtedly influence his
thinking. First, only he and his immediate cir-
cle, including the current military comman-
ders, know precisely what their role in
Gukurahundi was. They also know that the loss
of power will follow the full revelation of their
involvement and culpability. Second, because
of their unique access to present streams of
intelligence through the all-pervasive Central
Intelligence Organization, Mugabe and his mil-
itary commanders know the depth of anger still
simmering just beneath the surface in the com-
munities that suffered under Gukurahundi. 
Moreover, Mugabe is undoubtedly aware
of how Charles Taylor of Liberia and other
despots have been treated in recent years
after they lost power. He must be fully aware
that the moment he loses power and with it
his presidential immunity from prosecution,
people will push to have him and the respon-
sible military commanders and politicians
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indicted for crimes against humanity or
genocide.
Because of that threat to his personal free-
dom, his loss of power is anathema not only to
Mugabe personally but also, importantly, to a
key circle of military and political leaders who
are equally culpable for Gukurahundi. In their
minds, they cannot compromise because the
consequences of the loss of power are un-
thinkable. To understand the Zimbabwean
crisis, then, one must assume that Mugabe
and his inner circle will do whatever is neces-
sary to retain power. 
Furthermore, that common fear acts as a
powerful bond uniting all those responsible
for Gukurahundi. Thus, the Zimbabwean cri-
sis must be distinguished from, for example,
the final years in power of Daniel arap Moi of
Kenya. In many countries throughout the
world, the trappings of office become addic-
tive and politicians have to be prized away
from office. But Moi never feared ending up in
the International Court of Justice in the
Hague and so, although he lost the trappings
of office, he had nothing else to fear. While
Mugabe undoubtedly enjoys the trappings of
his office, the biggest obstacle to change is the
collective fear felt by the ruling elite of the con-
sequences of losing political power.
Third, consider the failure of the Economic
Structural Adjustment Program. The collapse
of the Soviet bloc and the end of apartheid in
the early 1990s saw the ZANU-PF lose some of
its leverage over the West. The need to keep
Zimbabwe out of the Soviet sphere of influ-
ence and the need to use the Zimbabwean “rec-
onciliation” experience to allay white South
African fears regarding postapartheid South
Africa no doubt greatly influenced Western
foreign policy toward Zimbabwe in the 1980s—
especially with regard to ignoring Gukura-
hundi and the ZANU-PF’s authoritarian incli-
nations. 
With those Western fears removed, how-
ever, the ZANU-PF became more vulnerable
to Western criticism and declining Western
aid. At the same time, the Zimbabwean econ-
omy was faltering and with the postindepen-
dence honeymoon definitively over, the
ZANU-PF government faced growing oppo-
sition from trade unions and student organi-
zations. The Zimbabwean government had
to do something to bolster the economy.
In that context, the ZANU-PF government
embraced the International Monetary Fund’s
Economic Structural Adjustment Program. In
1992, the IMF made the first disbursement of
US$216 million. Further amounts of US$65
million, US$76 million, and US$75 million fol-
lowed in 1993, 1994, and 1995.32 The stated goal
of those loans was the liberalization of the
Zimbabwean economy, which I saw as a possible
prelude to political liberalization in the country:
Economic liberalization and politi-
cal protectionism are incompatible.
It goes without saying that trade lib-
eralization and structural adjustment
cannot work in a vacuum. The experi-
ence of the world is that genuine
democracies have the strongest econ-
omies. Economic liberalization will not
work in Zimbabwe unless government
abandons its policy of political protec-
tionism. I need to stress that I am not
saying that economic liberalization will
not work in Zimbabwe. I am simply say-
ing that unless government is encour-
aged to bring about genuine democracy
in Zimbabwe and liberalize the political
environment, the long-term economic
outlook for Zimbabwe will be bleak. . . .
Without the free flow of information,
even if controls in the economy are
relaxed corruption will continue to
flourish. Corruption can only be stifled
if there is a free flow of information,
through ongoing investigative report-
ing which exposes corruption. I believe
that corruption is an epidemic which if
allowed to continue will undermine the
entire economy, and it is therefore
imperative, if trade liberalization is to
work, that it be brought under control.
. . . The history of Africa and other devel-
oping countries shows that undemocra-
tic Governments are inevitably followed
by increased corruption, increased infla-
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tion and eventual economic decline.
The only people who flourish are the
Government Ministers, the externally
based shareholders of multi-nationals
and the privileged few Chief Executives
of locally based companies who have
managed to illegally obtain foreign cur-
rency. Because of this I believe that if we
are genuinely interested in a future in
Zimbabwe and a sound economic out-
look we need to take a serious long term
view and consider what we as business
people can do to ensure that economic
liberalization is accompanied by politi-
cal liberalization. . . . I believe that unless
these points are seriously considered . . .
a bright economic future in Zimbabwe
will at the least be severely retarded if
not reversed completely.33
The initial moves toward liberalization of
the Zimbabwean economy in the 1990s were
reversed to the point where Zimbabwe today is
the least free of the 141 economies around the
world measured by the Fraser Institute’s
Economic Freedom of the World report. The polit-
ical atmosphere in the country has also
become progressively more repressive. The
funds it received from the international finan-
cial institutions partly enabled the ZANU-PF
to consolidate power. Furthermore, the for-
eign aid money that flowed to the political
and business elite created a more obvious eco-
nomic gulf between the ruling elite and its
supporters—in particular the veterans of the
Rhodesian civil war. The creation of that gulf
was to have serious repercussions. 
1997: The Point of No Return
In 1997, three events occurred that set the
stage for the current crisis. First, the war veter-
ans loyal to the ZANU-PF became increasingly
disgruntled with the widening wealth gap
between themselves and the ruling elite. In an
effort to placate them, Mugabe agreed to pay
huge pensions and other benefits. Second, in an
effort to protect mining investments made by
the members of the Zimbabwean ruling elite in
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mugabe
ordered the costly deployment of thousands of
Zimbabwean troops to the DRC to prop up the
regime of Laurent Kabila. Third, toward the
end of the year, the government finally moved
on its threat to acquire vast tracts of land held
by white commercial farmers.
The combination of those three events led
to the dramatic crash of the Zimbabwean dol-
lar in November 1997 and to the beginning of
the Zimbabwean economy’s downward spiral.
That, in turn, spurred trade unions and civil
society to create a broad-based political oppo-
sition that culminated in the formation of the
Movement for Democratic Change in Septem-
ber 1999. For the first time since the demise of
Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union in
December 1987, the ZANU-PF faced real polit-
ical opposition. 
The ZANU-PF government had built up an
elaborate façade of democracy over many
years. Moreover, much of the international
community saw Mugabe as an icon of libera-
tion. The façade of democracy and Mugabe’s
stature came crashing down in the aftermath
of a 2000 referendum on a new constitution
that Mugabe proposed and lost. Appearing on
national television shortly after the result was
announced, Mugabe said he would accept the
result, but he was clearly shocked and apoplec-
tic. He soon turned on his opponents.
The benefit of hindsight has now clarified
that the ZANU-PF dramatically underestimat-
ed the civic body that coordinated the “No”
vote—the National Constitutional Assembly.
The government assumed that the NCA only
held sway in the country’s urban areas, where
a minority of the electorate resided. The
ZANU-PF was shocked to realize that some
500,000 commercial agricultural laborers had
overwhelmingly voted “No.” With a general
election scheduled for April 2000, the ZANU-
PF was suddenly thrown into disarray because
it faced the real prospect of losing that election
and its power. Furthermore, the success of the
NCA in winning the vote gave a huge boost to
the newly formed MDC.
The ZANU-PF Turns on Its Enemies
Since the 2000 referendum, the ZANU-PF
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has systematically torn down the elaborate
façade of democracy that it carefully con-
structed in the first two decades of its rule. In
direct response to its sense of vulnerability, the
ZANU-PF began to erode civil liberties in Zim-
babwe. In doing so, the ZANU-PF has reacted
rather than acting in accordance with a delib-
erate, well-calculated plan. The only underly-
ing goal of the new policies was to hold onto
power. The ZANU-PF has achieved that goal
with two broad tactics. First, it attacked what-
ever institution it deemed to support the
opposition. Second, it maintained its core
support through the confiscation and redis-
tribution of privately owned assets.
The ZANU-PF set out to break the oppo-
sition’s ability to organize and mobilize the
huge swing vote of the commercial agricul-
tural workers. Recognizing that the urban
vote was a lost cause, the party felt it could
still win elections if all rural voters supported
it because the majority of voters were in the
rural areas. However, in the referendum, farm
workers and agricultural employers had
joined forces to vote against the government.
If they were allowed to do so in the parlia-
mentary elections, they would tip the balance
in favor of the opposition.
Accordingly, Mugabe postponed the elec-
tions scheduled for April 2000, and the
ZANU-PF began to systematically disrupt the
opposition’s ability to organize in commercial
farming areas. Almost overnight, the ZANU-
PF supporters—spearheaded by war veterans
and coordinated by the military—started
invading privately held farms. Initially, the
ZANU-PF harassed the farm workers, but
when that action failed to break the opposi-
tion’s ability to organize, Mugabe’s forces
gradually notched up the violence against the
opposition. In early April 2000, Mugabe’s
thugs killed the first opposition activists and
later that month they killed the first white
farmers. The first two murders of white farm-
ers, chillingly well and gruesomely executed,
struck fear into the hearts and minds of the
farming community. By the time the election
was finally held in June 2000, support had
waned for the opposition in the rural areas.
Although the opposition swept the board in
the urban areas, on average obtaining over 75
percent of the vote, the ZANU-PF narrowly
won the election, securing 62 of the 120 seats
contested.
In the latter half of 2000, both the opposi-
tion and the Commercial Farmers Union
turned to the courts for redress. The opposi-
tion filed more than 30 electoral challenges to
seats won by the ZANU-PF. The CFU obtained
a landmark judgment in the Supreme Court
that challenged the legality of the govern-
ment’s land reform program. In 2001, the gov-
ernment responded by turning its attention to
the judiciary. By mid-2001, Chief Justice
Antony Gubbay, who was threatened with
physical violence, resigned. Mugabe replaced
him with a judge sympathetic to the govern-
ment. The original judgment obtained by the
CFU was reversed, and the newly constituted
Supreme Court rubber-stamped the govern-
ment’s blatantly unlawful land reform pro-
gram. During the same period, parliament
passed two laws—the Rural Land Occupiers
(Protection from Eviction) Act and the Land
Acquisition Amendment Act—giving “legal”
cover to illegal occupation of farms.34
During 2001, the ZANU-PF systematically
undermined the independence of the judicia-
ry. That activity led to a delay in the adjudica-
tion of the electoral challenges brought by the
opposition and ensured that the ZANU-PF
candidates, who had won illegally, did not lose
their seats. In the immediate run-up to the
2002 presidential election, the ZANU-PF
turned its attention back to the opposition
MDC. In November 2001, police detained sev-
eral MDC leaders and activists on trumped-up
charges. The government passed three new
parliamentary acts immediately before the
March 2002 presidential election. The Public
Order and Security Act hindered the opposi-
tion’s ability to organize meetings, and the
General Laws Amendment Act facilitated rig-
ging of the election. The Access to Infor-
mation and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA)
intimidated the independent print media,
enabling the government to shut it down if
necessary.35
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At the same time, the government brought
in senior army officers to manage the electoral
process. Shortly before the election, the senior
army officers held a press conference saying
that they would not serve under the opposi-
tion presidential candidate Morgan Tsvan-
girai. Finally, a few weeks before the election,
the government arrested Tsvangirai on trea-
son charges.
According to the official results, Mugabe
won the 2002 poll by 418,809 votes. The elec-
tion was marred by numerous irregularities
and condemned by a wide variety of interna-
tional organizations and governments. A
subsequent audit of the electoral materials
revealed massive irregularities and pointed to
Mugabe’s having lost the election—albeit by a
narrow margin.36
Just as the 2000 referendum result came as
a shock to the ZANU-PF, so did the 2002 pres-
idential election result. For two years prior to
the presidential election, the repressive appara-
tus of the state had murdered, tortured, and
intimidated the opposition. The government
disrupted the commercial farm workers’ orga-
nization and intimidated the farm owners into
withdrawing their support for the MDC.
Nevertheless, the opposition’s support had re-
mained strong. Significantly, although some
farmers had been summarily evicted from their
farms, the majority of white commercial farm-
ers were still in possession of their farms and
producing. 
At that juncture the ZANU-PF decided it
needed to do more to remain in power. Al-
though no serious political commentator would
dispute the obvious historical inequities in land-
holdings and the need to redress them, it is
doubtful that the ZANU-PF initially intended to
destroy commercial agriculture. In statements
made between the 1980s and 2001, the ZANU-
PF spoke about acquiring 8 million hectares of
some 14 million hectares owned by white com-
mercial farmers in 2000. During parliamentary
debates regarding the Land Acquisition Act
amendments, government ministers repeatedly
denied that their intention was to ethnically
cleanse Zimbabwe of white commercial farmers.
Immediately after the 2002 election, however, the
ZANU-PF realized that as long as a significant
number of white commercial farmers remained
on the land, the slide in the party’s rural support
would continue.
In April 2002, the government started sys-
tematically to evict farmers throughout the
country. A new amendment to the Land
Acquisition Act rendered farm owners’ contin-
ued occupation of farms illegal.37 In August
2002, the government ordered the police to
arrest farmers who still occupied their land
and allocated the most productive farms in
the country to cabinet ministers, judges, army
commanders, and other members of the
ZANU-PF elite. Mugabe swept aside any pre-
tence that the land reform program was
meant predominantly to address the plight of
landless peasants. The ruling elite started cher-
ry-picking the best farms, going as far as to
displace the war veterans and peasants who
had occupied the farms earlier.
The government’s attack on the opposi-
tion MDC continued in the courts. Much of
the focus against the opposition centered on
the treason trials involving Tsvangirai and
the MDC secretary general Welshman Ncube
that ultimately culminated in their acquittal
in November 2004. A March 2004 report
showed that 90 percent of the MDC mem-
bers of parliament (MPs) elected in June 2000
had suffered some human rights violation;
24 percent survived murder attempts and 42
percent had been tortured. State agents mur-
dered three MDC MPs.38 At the same time,
the systematic killings, torture, and deten-
tion of MDC supporters continued. By the
end of 2004, more than 600 MDC supporters
had been murdered—often by known state
agents. Thousands more had been tortured,
assaulted, or otherwise harmed. Since 2000,
not a single suspect has been tried let alone
convicted for any of those crimes.
In 2003, Mugabe used the AIPPA to elimi-
nate the last remnants of Zimbabwe’s free press.
In 2001, a bomb destroyed the printing press of
an independent newspaper called the Daily
News. Remarkably, the newspaper managed to
continue publishing. In September 2003, how-
ever, the government used the AIPPA to revoke
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the license that the paper needed to continue
operating.
Using Food Aid as a Weapon
In the course of 2003 and 2004, the gov-
ernment started to use another weapon—the
selective distribution of food. Corn is the sta-
ple diet of most Zimbabweans. Farmers of
small-scale communal plots who kept most
of their crop for their own consumption grew
most of the corn in Zimbabwe. Until they
were dispossessed under the land reform pro-
gram, large-scale commercial farmers pro-
duced the bulk of the corn marketed through
the state-run Grain Marketing Board. Since
2001, Zimbabwe has had to import about a
million tons of corn every year to make up for
the shortfall (see Figure 8).39
As the large-scale growers’ operations were
closed down, the loss of business affected the
many service suppliers, warehouses, distribu-
tors, and workshops that used to operate from
all the small farming-area towns. Because most
of those businesses were forced to close, the
loss of their services has severely affected the
small-scale communal farmers as well. The
same business decline undermined all the
efforts to make successful farmers of all those
who were allocated land under the land reform
program.
In 2004, with shortages of the staple food
becoming the norm, the ZANU-PF imposed
tight controls on the sale and distribution of
corn, effectively giving itself control over the
distribution of the increasingly scarce com-
modity. That proved to be a particularly effec-
tive political weapon in the run-up to the 2005
parliamentary general election.40
Although a few token changes were made
to the electoral laws before the 2005 poll, all
the main legislative components that enabled
the manipulation of the electoral process were
maintained. Not surprisingly, whereas the
opposition retained all but one of the contest-
ed urban seats, it lost ground in the rural
areas. Because of the failure of the judicial
process following the 2000 and 2002 elections,
the opposition did not mount any serious
legal challenge to the results.
Despite the government’s many attacks on
the opposition, the MDC retained effective con-
trol of every urban center after the 2005 election.
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Reacting to that election result, the government
launched Operation Murambatsvina against
the urban poor who formed the core of the
opposition’s support base. As previously men-
tioned, the operation rendered some 700,000
people jobless or homeless. In doing so, it dealt
the economy another devastating blow. 
In August 2005 the government sealed the
fate of white commercial farmers with the pas-
sage of Constitutional Amendment no. 17,
which removed any remaining right of the
commercial farmers to have the courts adjudi-
cate the confiscation of their properties.
Mugabe’s New Enemy: 
The Economy
The government has compromised the
independence of the judiciary, destroyed the
productivity of the white commercial farm-
ing sector, and weakened the opposition, but
now it has a new enemy—the falling econo-
my. Zimbabwe faces skyrocketing inflation
and rapidly rising government domestic
debt. Because the precipitous fall in econom-
ic activity during recent years has limited tax
revenue, the budget deficit seems certain to
rise well above the already unacceptable level
of 60 percent of GDP.41 Similarly, Figure 9
shows the recent explosion of the govern-
ment’s domestic debt in nominal terms.
Because of the worsening economic situa-
tion, the governor of the Reserve Bank of Zim-
babwe, Gideon Gono, proposed a solution in the
form of a new “social contract.” His intention
was to achieve an agreement among business,
labor, and government to hold prices, wages, and
government spending constant. They reached
agreement on June 1, 2007, but a mere two weeks
later a huge spike in inflation caused the agree-
ment to fall apart (see Figure 10).
The government’s reaction was to accuse
the business sector of being part of a “regime
change” agenda sponsored by the West. The
government ordered a 50 percent cut in the
prices of basic commodities and, backed by
militia groups, police launched raids on busi-
nesses to ensure that they were complying
with the order. Thousands of managers were
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detained countrywide. At the same time, in a
practice reminiscent of the farm invasions,
the army, police, and ZANU-PF supporters
stormed shops and availed themselves of
goods worth billions of Zimbabwean dollars.
Inevitably, supplies have dried up,42 rapidly
exacerbating the humanitarian crisis with
food becoming scarcer than ever.
In November 2007, the parliament passed
an Indigenization Bill. Ostensibly, that bill is
designed to rectify—27 years after indepen-
dence—the injustices caused by white colonial
rule. The bill, yet to be signed into law by
Mugabe, obliges every business to be con-
trolled through a majority shareholding by
“indigenous” or nonwhite Zimbabweans. The
net effect of this measure will be to ensure that
no white person can ever own a business in
Zimbabwe again. It will also ensure that no
foreign investor can ever control a business in
Zimbabwe again.
The bill should be viewed as a measure
designed to ensure that largely urban-based
businesses, which have generally supported
the opposition, are transferred into the con-
trol of people more sympathetic to the gov-
ernment. If the land reform program is any
indication, the ZANU-PF will also use the
Indigenization Bill to reward its supporters.
Just as the main beneficiaries of the land
reform program have been the ruling elite,
lucrative white and foreign-controlled busi-
nesses are likely to end up in the hands of the
ruling elite. Moreover, one can reasonably
assume that the new owners of those busi-
nesses will run them down as badly as they
did the formerly highly productive farms
they have destroyed over the last seven years.
The Way Forward
The world has rightly laid most of the blame
for the Zimbabwean catastrophe at the door of
Mugabe and his ZANU-PF government. How-
ever, the international community must accept
that it is complicit in one respect. International
financial institutions and Western aid agencies
poured billions of U.S. dollars into Zimbabwe.
There is very little to show for all that money in
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Zimbabwe today. The truth is that the ZANU-
PF used much of that money to consolidate
power and to suppress its subjects. At the same
time, the international community, especially
other African countries, ignored very serious
deficiencies in governance and in so doing
assisted in the perpetuation of the culture of
impunity and violence that has plagued
Zimbabwean society for so long. 
The humanitarian and economic crises are
so severe now that a danger exists that the inter-
national community will again act expediently
without helping Zimbabweans address the root
causes of Zimbabwe’s malaise. As calamitous as
the situation is, Zimbabwe remains a country
with enormous potential, but she will never
reach that potential unless Zimbabweans make
some difficult decisions and agree to respect
certain fundamental principles.
Any political settlement brokered by the
international community, South Africa in
particular, must have certain essential ingre-
dients.
At the root of Zimbabwe’s problems is its
highly deficient constitution. In particular, the
vast disparity of power between the executive,
on the one hand, and the legislature and the
judiciary, on the other hand, has contributed to
the gross abuses that have destroyed Zimbab-
we. A new democratic constitution must be
agreed to through a process embraced by all
Zimbabweans. That constitution must balance
power among the three arms of government
and ensure that the independence of the media
is greatly strengthened. It must also create new
institutions to support democracy, such as an
independent electoral commission. When the
new constitution has been legislated and the
institutions mentioned have been established,
any international aid should help strengthen
those institutions.
The current constitution has enabled the
Zimbabwean government to become all-perva-
sive. Its tentacles extend into every aspect of soci-
ety and indeed the notion of a large government
that meddles in every aspect of Zimbabweans’
lives has become a part of Zimbabwean culture.
As has been vividly demonstrated in the last few
months in the context of the price controls, gov-
ernment’s involvement in the operation of every
business, school, university, and sporting insti-
tution has had deleterious consequences for the
Zimbabwean economy. Any new constitution
must support Zimbabwe’s need for limited gov-
ernment. Outside aid and advice should focus
on helping Zimbabwe create a legal and regula-
tory framework in which the private sector can
flourish without unnecessary impediments.
The vast majority of Zimbabweans live in
reservoirs of poverty known as communal
areas. The people living there have no title to
their land, and their material circumstances
have greatly deteriorated during the 27 years
of the ZANU-PF rule. That arrangement has
helped the ruling elite keep those rural
Zimbabweans subservient to the government.
As Moeletsi Mbeki, the South African com-
mentator, has observed, the fundamental
problem facing Africa’s development is the
enormous power imbalance between the polit-
ical elite and key private-sector producers.
Until the structural powerlessness of produc-
ers is addressed, no meaningful development
will occur in sub-Saharan Africa. As Mbeki
puts it, “It is therefore necessary that peasants,
who constitute the core of the private sector in
sub-Saharan Africa, become the real owners of
their primary asset—land.”43 Zimbabwe is no
different. A commitment, therefore, must be
made to respect existing title and to extend
title to the vast majority of Zimbabweans liv-
ing in communal areas.
Zimbabwe cannot move forward without
addressing its past. Although the fear that
Mugabe and the ZANU-PF ruling elite have of
future prosecution may be the single biggest
obstacle to securing a peaceful transition to
democracy, future stability in Zimbabwe will
not be assured until the ghosts of the past have
been laid to rest. The first necessary step in this
process will be the establishment of a Truth
Commission that will provide an opportunity
for victims to explain what has happened to
them over the last several decades. Such a com-
mission must also allow them to say what mea-
sures they believe are necessary to achieve mean-
ingful justice and reconciliation in Zimbabwe. It
is important that such a Truth Commission go
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back to 1965, when Ian Smith’s Rhodesian
Front announced its unilateral declaration of
independence from Great Britain. Going back
that far is necessary, because the deepest roots of
Zimbabwe’s current problems go back to the
time when the intransigence of the white minor-
ity government radicalized the Black Nationalist
movement, which, in turn, set the stage for the
bitter liberation struggle waged in the 1970s. 
The sine qua non for the restoration of
Zimbabwe’s economy and institutions is the
return to Zimbabwe of the millions of skilled
and educated Zimbabweans who have left the
country over the last three decades. Without
their skills, the Zimbabwean economy cannot
grow to full potential. International humani-
tarian organizations could help fund the return
of these expatriates to Zimbabwe.
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